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ABSTRACT 
Suzette Applegate Baker: Essays in the Microeconomics of Medical Specialization (Under 
the direction of Gary Biglaiser) 
    This dissertation consists of two essays. In the first essay, I examine the interaction 
between medical specialization and patient referrals. I develop a model that 
demonstrates which doctors are likely to specialize, which doctors are likely to refer, 
and which doctors are likely to treat patients without a referral. I show that the 
introduction of more specialists -- and the corresponding need for more referring 
doctors -- can reduce the overall number of health care providers actually treating 
patients. Finally, I compare the socially optimal and joint profit maximizing (1) quantity 
of specialists, (2) price of specialist services, and (3) price of generalist services. I find 
that, when doctors collectively set prices for both specialist and generalist treatment. 
Depending on the parameters, the joint maximization problem can result in (a) too 
many specialists and two few generalists; (b) too many generalists and too few 
specialists; or (c) the optimal number of specialists and generalists. This ambiguous 
result shares similarities with the textbook model of the quantity decisions of a multi-
market monopolist. 
       The second essay considers the role played by fellowship programs in the training of 
medical researchers. Many hospitals hire senior researchers straight out of their own or 
another hospital's fellowship program. As a result, medical programs both "train" 
 
 
iv 
fellows and provide a supply of medical talent for that hospital in the next period. Using 
an overlapping generation model, I derive three results linking the underlying features 
of the medical marketplace, the size of fellowship programs, and the quality of medical 
research. First, when the hospital's time horizon or discount rate increases, the hospital 
tends to employ more fellows each period. Second, when the fellow's outside option 
depends on their skill level, the hospital employs fewer fellows each period. Finally, 
when the fellow's outside option depends on their skill level and the number of other 
fellows in the private-sector market, the hospital employs more fellows than in the case 
where the outside option depends on the fellow's skill level only. 
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MEDICAL SPECIALISTS I: COORDINATION OF 
SPECIALISTS AND PATIENTS 
1.1 Introduction 
Specialization by physicians has transformed the way medical care is provided. By focusing 
on a single illness or injury, a specialist obtains a deep knowledge about that ailment and 
is able to keep abreast of the latest research. And, not surprisingly, many studies show 
that doctors with more knowledge provide higher quality care (see, e.g., Clark et al., 1997; 
Carbona et al. 2006). The problem, however, is that in order for patients and doctors to 
get the benefits of specialization, they need to be correctly matched. The question I address 
is: What factors influence the optimal degree of medical specialization, taking into account 
the cost of coordinating patients and physician-specialists.1 
According to a recent survey of U.S. patients, "[a]lmost 63 million adults~nearly three 
in lO~said they needed a new specialist in the previous year, with 46 million actually seeing 
a new specialist." (Th and Launer 2008 p. 2). The survey goes on to estimate that 86.5% 
of patients use primary care referral or another doctor's referral when selecting a specialist. 
The existing literature on specialization focuses on costs and benefits of team production, 
where each team member has a different skill essential to production of a good (Jones 2008, 
I Starting shortly after World War II, the United States began to see a rise in doctors who specialize 
in treating, say, one type of cancer in children or a specific problem related to ligament damage in the 
knee (Donini-Lenhoff and Hedrick 2000). Since then, the provision of medical services has become increas-
ingly fragmented, with doctors treating a smaller sliver of the range of possible illnesses and injuries. In 
2007, 86 percent of graduating medical students planned to become certified in a speciality or subspeciality 
(Association of American Medical Colleges 2007). 
Becker and Murphy 1992, Alchian and Demestz 1972). I study a di¤erent coordination
problem here the matching of patients with a specic illness with a doctor who specializes
in that illness. This problem shares some similarity with the economic literature analyzing
the role of middlemen in facilitating consumer choice in other market contexts (see, e.g.,
Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1987). But the results from this literature do not translate well
into doctor/patient matching. Unlike consumers in other contexts, patients do not know
what they want. Their goal is to "become healthy," but they dont know how to make that
happen. This di¤erence is important and serves as the launching point for my contributions
to the literature, which are fourfold.
First, in my model, the coordinating agent the referring doctor must have a special
skill, the ability to diagnose illnesses. As I explain, this requirement eliminates the risk of
mismatch but crowds out treatment. Second, I demonstrate that specialization drives up
the wages of all doctors, not just the specialists. The reason is that workers with unequal
talents, i.e., those who are excellent at treating one illness and bad at treating other illnesses,
perform tasks for which they have a comparative advantage. On the other hand, workers
who are equally good at treating all illnesses remain in the general market and provide
treatment no matter the injury. This reduces the risk associated with generalized care and,
as a result, patients will spend more for that service.
Third, as prices increase, the patients with the highest cost of seeking care forgo treat-
ment. The optimal amount of specialization balances the cost of this patient exit against
the gains from each additional patient-doctor match. Finally, I show that doctors acting
in concert but assuming full employment cannot set prices to simultaneously restrict the
amount of specialist services and generalist services.2 This result shares similarities with
2 In health care markets, prices are occasionally set by agreement between groups of doctors and insurance
carriers (Choudhry and Brennan 2001 p. 1143). In these agreements, individual doctors have little control
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the output decisions of a standard multi-market monopoly.
Illustrative of referring-doctor-as-middleman is the "Best Doctor, Inc." agency [www.bestdoctors.com].
This agency recruits doctors to help match patients who are facing a very serious illness with
the appropriate medical expert.3 These doctors dont treat patients, but instead serve as an
information conduit a mediator between patients and other experts. A second illustration
comes from the behavior of general practitioners. While some practitioners are willing to
provide more than generalized care, many are quick to refer. When choosing a primary care
physician, patients decide whether they want a "true" generalist who treats most illnesses
or a chief provider who oversees and coordinates, while specialists treat. Depending on
the size of the local market, true generalists may be crowded out by chief providers and
specialists.
The paper relates to the matching model literature (see, for example, Diamond 1982 and
Mortensen 1982). In those models, workers match with rms. A successful match creates
a surplus, which can be divided between the two parties. One question is what wage rate,
if any, ensures a stable equilibrium. The equilibrium number of job vacancies and the level
of unemployment is then compared with the ones a social planner would pick. Demange
and Gale (1985) and Gale and Shapley (1962) study two-sided matching models. In these
models, an outcome is stable if no two parties from opposite sides of the market can gain by
deviating and forming a di¤erent partnership. The model here involves matching of patients
with doctors. The equilibrium concept is similar. Given a set of prices, an equilibrium exists
if no doctor and no patient want to change positions.
over the price of services (McGuire 2000; p. 481). With no control over price, McGuire suggests that
physicians exercise their market power by increasing the quantity of services above what the patient prefers.
See also Ma and McGuire (2002).
3According to their marketing materials, Best Doctors "gives members insight and information about
their diagnosis, the latest advances and where they can turn for state-of-the-art care when faced with a
serious medical problem." See www.bestdoctors.com.
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A second set of related literature concerns two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole 2002;
Rochet and Tirole 2006). In these markets, a platform provider must ensure that both
consumers and producers use the service. With credit cards, for example, issuers must
consider how the interchange transfer fee will a¤ect the merchantspropensity to accept the
card for purchases and the consumers propensity to use the card. In the leading article on
the subject, Rochet and Tirole (2002) demonstrate that issuers might set a fee that results
in the overuse of credit cards as compared to the social optimum. In their model, merchants
too readily accept cards. The reason is that merchants make the decision whether to accept
credit cards anticipating that they will service the average card user, not the marginal user.
The average user will attach a higher benet to card use and, as a result, be willing to pay
more for the convenience of using his card. Praying on the merchants eagerness to attract
card-carrying customers, issuers set a higher than optimal transfer fee.
In the model developed here, there exists a similar potential for an overprovision of
services, specically medical specialist services. This problem occurs when doctors collective
set prices. The expansion of specialist services decreases the price of specialist services,
while increasing the price of generalist services. The price is based on the average benet
a patient receives from treatment, rather than the marginal benet. As a result, under
some conditions, the boost in the price of generalist services more than compensates for
the possible decrease in the price of speciality services, making the expansion of speciality
services attractive.
A third related strand is the wide-ranging work on labor specialization and investment
in human capital. For example, Kim (1989) considers a situation where workers can invest
in both the depth and breath of human capital. As market size increases, workers want to
deepen their specic skill set, rather than increase the number of tasks they are capable of
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doing. The reason is that a large market contains more employers. With more employers,
there is a greater chance the worker will be matched with an employer who values and
therefore rewards  the deep specic skill set. Along similar lines, Baumgardner (1988)
looks at the division of labor within service industries. He shows a trade-o¤ between in-
creasing returns to production in each activity and decreasing marginal revenue. A more
narrowly-focused worker is better at a specic task, allowing him to charge higher prices.
But specialization has a downside fewer potential customers. The optimal degree of spe-
cialization trades o¤ the gains from specialization against the losses from weaker demand.
Along related lines, Bolton and Dewatripoint (1994) and Becker and Murphy (1992) point
out the amount of specialization depends heavily on the cost of coordination among special-
ists: the more specialists, the greater the coordination costs and the lower the net return
from an additional specialist.
The paper closest to mine is Garciano (2000). He considers the problem of communica-
tion within organizations. In his model, workers specialize in the production of knowledge
or the transmission of knowledge. His key result is that harder problems are those most
likely to be referred up the chain of command. The higher up in the chain a worker is, the
more di¢ cult the problems the organization will ask him to solve. A pyramid scheme re-
sults. This organization form minimizes communication costs while ensuring that problems
can be solved (only hard problems are continually referred upward, which reduces the cost
of transmission). My model di¤ers because some "low-level" doctors decide to treat pa-
tients (i.e., solve the problem themselves), even though they could refer to a more qualied
doctor for treatment. Patients dont complain about this practice because, in equilibrium,
the price adjusts to reect the lower quality of treatment generalists o¤er. In addition,
the "communication cost" is the cost to the patient of making an additional trip to the
5
specialist.
Finally, there is some recent empirical work on medical specialists. Johnson (2009) nds
that, over time, primary care physicians learn about the quality of specialists to which they
refer. As a result, she nds some evidence that lower quality specialists are more likely to
drop out of the market. The sorting mechanism in Johnsons framework is that referrring
physicians learn about specialist talent. In my model, fewer patients are treated because a
subset of doctors opt to focus on referring patients rather than treating them. Since fewer
doctors are available for treatment, some patients dont receive any care whatsoever.
Part 1.2 develops the model. Part 3 explores the level of specialization that maximizes
social welfare. Part 3.1 considers corner solutions, where welfare is maximized by having ei-
ther no specialists, as many specialists as feasibly possible, or failing to use all the available
doctors. In part 4, doctors set prices. The prices set induce a certain number of referring
doctors, specialists, and generalists in equilibrium. Depending on the parameter congura-
tions, doctors set prices to induce too much or too little specialization as compared to the
social optimum. Part 5 concludes.
1.2 The Model
Patients are denoted by j. Each patient represents a point on the continuum [0; n]. Patients
are equally likely to have a type 1 illness or a type 2 illness. Over the entire continuum half
the patients have a type 1 illness, half the patients have a type 2 illness. Patients do not
know their illness type. Given this uncertainty, each patient decides whether to (1) seek
care from a generalist doctor; (2) go to a referring doctor, have their illness identied, and
be rerouted to a medical specialist, or (3) forgo treatment. Assume that patients cannot
see a specialist without rst getting a referral.
To understand the meaning of a "generalist" doctor, consider a patient with chest pain.
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The patient can go to a generalist, a primary care physician who has a reputation for solving
problems immediately. This doctor has devoted his resources to treating patients with a
broad range of illnesses. So, his initial action is to treat the patient as opposed to refer
to a specialist. The doctor might run tests and prescribe a better diet, exercise, vitamins,
and medicine. That treatment would be benecial and provide some relief. However,
this treatment might not be drastic enough. If instead the patient went to a primary
care physician known for referring patients, that doctor would have sent him to a leading
cardiologist. The cardiologist might have considered a more aggressive and newer treatment
option.
Denote doctors by i. Like patients, doctors fall on the continuum [0; n]. Doctors can
treat one patient per period. In the time it takes to do a treatment, a doctor can refer two
patients to specialists. That is to say, referrals take half the time of an actual treatment.
The outcome in monetary terms of medical treatment depends on the doctors skill
level. If the patient has a type 1 illness, (i) is the patients monetary value associated with
treatment by doctor i. If the patient has a type 2 illness, 	(i) is the patients outcome from
treatment. Doctors have the same amount of human capital, spread di¤erently between
the two types of illnesses. Some doctors are equally good at treating both illnesses. Other
doctors have a high ability in treating one illness and a low ability in treating the other
illness. A doctor cannot have a high ability in treating both illnesses. To capture di¤erences
in ability, I assume that the outcome function for illness one, (i), is linear and decreasing
in the doctor index. The outcome function for illness two, 	(i), is linear and increasing in
the doctor index. The benet functions are symmetric ((1) = 	(n)).
Figure 1 represents the patients benet associated with treatment by each doctor i.
The vertical axis represents the patients benet from treatment for illness 1, (i), and for
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illness 2, 	(i). The horizontal axis represents the doctors, indexed from 0 to n.
Patient’s Outcome
From Treatment
Ψ(i)
Θ(i)
0 n
Doctors
Figure 1: The Relationship Between Patient Benet and Doctor Skill Levels
1.2.1 Patient Payo¤s
Patients pay an out-of pocket price to the treating doctor. te is the price paid after getting
a referral and being rerouted to an expert doctor; tg is the price paid for treatment by
a generalist without the referring middleman. In addition to the out-of-pocket expenses,
patients face a cost, k(j), per doctor visit. Because of a less debilitating sickness, helpful
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family members, or a home located in an area with lots of medical services, some patients
nd it easier to go to a doctor. Patients who reside close to zero on the continuum have
a lower cost per visit than patients who reside close to n. More specically, I assume that
the cost function, k, is increasing and linear in j. If a patient sees a generalist, he makes
one trip to the doctor. A referral requires two doctor visits one to the referring doctor
and a second to the specialist. The patients utility from treatment is v(), where v0() > 0
and v00() < 0.
Patients are uncertain which specialist doctor they will be sent to after seeking a referral.
Likewise, patients are uncertain which generalist will treat them if they select generalist
treatment. They form expectations about these facts by looking at the pool of available
specialists and generalists.
If, for example, there are six referring doctors and twelve specialists, the patient seeking
a referral anticipates treatment by a doctor with the average skill level among the twelve
specialists. Similarly, if there are thirty generalists in the market, a patient seeking care
anticipates the care associated with the average generalist among these thirty physicians.
In short, each patient faces a lottery over possible outcomes, where each doctor in
the generalist pool or specialist pool has an equal chance of being selected.4 Generalist
treatment involves a compound lottery. First, there is a lottery over which illness the
patient has type 1 or type 2. Second, there is a lottery over the possible outcomes from
treatment given the generalist pool.
To sum up, patient j0s utility depends on (1) the outcome from treatment, (2) the price
paid for medical services; (3) whether she sees a generalist or, via a referral sees a specialist;
4Suppose that the doctor interval [a; b] represents a specialist pool. The probablity of seeing a doctor of
skill level x or less is distributed uniformly over that range. The density is the same for each doctor in the
interval, reecting that a patient has an equal chance of seeing each doctor in the pool.
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(4) the skill level of the pool of doctors doing the treatment, and (5) the individualized cost
per visit.
Given a pool of type 1 specialists, [a; b], a patient who seeks a referral and is discovered
to have a type 1 illness receives expected utility
1
b  a
bR
a
v((i))di  te   2k(j) (1)
Given a pool of type 2 specialists, [c; d], a patient who seeks a referral and is discovered to
have a type 2 illness receives expected utility
1
d  c
dR
c
v(	(i))di  te   2k(j) (2)
Finally, given a pool of generalists, [e; f ], the patients expected utility from seeking gener-
alist treatment is
1
2(f   e)
fR
e
(v((i)) + v(	(i))) di  tg   k(j) (3)
The utility functions show that patients di¤er in the "net" benet from medical treatment.
Because k(n) > k(0), patients close to n have a lower net benet from treatment than
patients close to 0.
1.2.2 Doctor Payo¤s
Individual doctors are price takers. Referring doctors diagnose the patients illness, 1 or
2, and then send patients to specialists. Unlike patients, referring doctors know the skill
level of each specialist and route patients to the available specialist with the highest skill
level. The specialist cannot bypass the referring doctor and solve the matching problem
by signaling their practice area through advertisements or other marketing materials. The
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patients dont know what illness they have. As a result, they dont know which specialist
to see.
Let r;g; e be the probabilities that a doctor has patient demand for his services if
he chooses to be a referring doctor, generalist, or specialist respectively. In modeling these
probabilities, rst consider markets for referring doctors and generalists. In these markets,
the probability that a doctor actually has a patient to treat depends on the number of
patients and the number of doctors. If the supply of doctors outstrips the demand for
doctors, the chance an individual doctor actually sees a patient is less than one, but greater
than zero.
To capture this easily, let g =
# of patients seeking generalists
# of generalists doctors and r =
# of patients seeking referrals
# of referring doctors .
If, for example, the number of patients in the market for generalist treatment is 80 and the
number of doctors is 100, the probability that an individual doctor sees a patient is 810 . If
the number of patients exceeds the number of doctors in a market, let  = 1:
If a doctor enters the referral market, he might refer one patient, two patients, or
no patients. Each draw from the pool of patients seeking referrals is independent. The
probability a referring doctor sees two patients is rr; the probability a referring doctor
sees one patient is 2r(1 r); and the probability he sees no patients is (1 r)(1 r).
The specialist market is di¤erent. Because referring doctors know the skill level of the
specialist doctors, a specialist doctor will only be routed a patient if his skill level exceeds
the skill level of the weakest member of the specialist pool focusing on that illness. If the
supply of specialists exceeds the demand for specialists, the specialists closest to the middle
of the distribution of doctors are referred no patients.5
5Formally, we could denote the least-skilled specialist focusing on illness 1 as i and the least-skilled
specialist focusing on illness 2 as i: Then, for illness type 1, e = 1 if i  i and e = 0 if i  i (recall that
for type 1 illness, doctor 0 is the most skilled and doctor n is the least skilled). For a type 2 illness, its
reversed, e = 1 if i  i and e = 0 if i  i:
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Finally, let F be the fee that the specialist pays the referring doctor out of the payment
he receives from the patient, te.
We can now dene the doctors expected payo¤ concisely as
EU =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
e[te   F ] if specialist
rr2F + 2r(1  r)F if referring doctor
gtg if generalist
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
1.2.3 Timing and Initial Results
The timing of the game follows: First, prices are set. Then, each doctor decides what to
do: become a specialist, become a referring doctor, or become a generalist. Also, patients
decide whether to seek a referral, go to a generalist, or forgo treatment. Finally, all patients
seeking care are treated and outcomes observed.
Assume that doctors do not set prices for now (i.e., take prices as given). Let s be
the number of specialists and s2 the number of referring doctors needed to support those
specialists.
Proposition 1 For any value s 2 [0; 2n3 ] there exists a set of prices

te(s); tg(s); F (s)
	
such that the following is one of many Nash equilibrium: (1) Patients in the interval [0; s]
seek referrals and treatment by a specialist; (2) Patients in the interval (s; n  s2 ] seek treat-
ment from generalists; (3) Patients in the interval (n   s2 ; n] forgo treatment; (4) Doctors
in the intervals [0; s2 ] and [n   s2 ; n] specialize; (5) doctors in the interval [3s4 ; n   3s4 ] pro-
vide generalist treatment; and (6) doctors in the intervals ( s2 ;
3s
4 ) and (n  3s4 ; n  s2) refer
patients.
Proof:
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Step One:
Find the value of tg that makes the patient indexed by n  s2 indi¤erent between seeing
a generalist, who he anticipates to be the average generalist in the market, and forgoing
treatment. This value is determined by
1
n  3s2
n  3s
4R
3s
4
1
2
[v((i)) + v(	(i))] di  k(n  s
2
)  tg = 0 (4)
Step Two:
Assume the last patient seeking a specialist has a type 1 illness. Find the value te that
makes this patient indexed by s just indi¤erent between seeing the average specialist in the
market for type 1 specialists and seeing the average generalist in the market. This value is
determined by
1
s
2
s
2R
0
v((i))di  te   2k(s) = (5)
1
n  3s2
n  3s
4R
3s
4
1
2
[v((i)) + v(	(i))] di  k(s)  tg
Step Three:
The cost per visit, k(j), is smaller than k(s) for all j < s. As a result, for these patients,
the LHS of (5) is bigger than the RHS of (5). This means that, at the price, te, each patient
between [0; s] strictly prefers the average specialist in the pool to the average generalist
in the pool. Conversely, at the price te every patient in the interval (s; n] strictly prefers
treatment by the average generalist to the average specialist available in the market.
The cost per visit, k(j), is smaller than k(n   s2) for j 2 (s; n   s2 ]. As a result, for
these patients, the LHS of (4) is bigger than the RHS of (4). So these patients do not want
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to deviate and forgo treatment. And since, as noted above, these patients do not want to
deviate and take the specialist treatment, they have no protable deviation. For patients
in the interval (n  s2 ; n], the RHS of (4) is bigger than the LHS of (4). As a result, at the
price tg , these patients cant deviate and take generalist treatment without being made
worse o¤. And, as shown previously, these patients also do not want to deviate and take
specialist treatment, leaving them no protable deviation. Therefore these patients chose
to forgo treatment.
Step Four:
Moving to doctors, nd the value of F that makes the following hold
tg  2rrF + 2r(1  r)F (6)
te   F  2rrF + 2r(1  r)F (7)
2F  gtg (8)
te   F  gtg (9)
Equations (6) and (7) ensure that no generalist and no specialist want to deviate and
become a referring doctor, given the number of other doctors doing referrals. Equations
(8) and (9) ensure that no referring doctor and no specialist want to deviate and become
a generalist, given the number of other generalists in the market. As dened earlier, r =
# of patients seeking referrals
# of referring doctors and g =
# of patients seeking generalists
# of generalists doctors . In equilibrium, r = g = 1.
In addition, the price taking assumption means that a doctor deviation wont change the
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market price. The previous four equations therefore reduce to
tg  2F (10)
te   F  2F (11)
2F  tg (12)
te   F  tg (13)
Equations (10) and (12) can only be satised simultaneously if F  = t

g
2 . Given F
, equations
(11) and (13) hold if te  32 tg, which is true if the utility uptick from specialist treatment
is su¢ ciently large.
A referring doctor or generalist doctor who switched and tried to snag a patient from
the specialists would reap no patients. The referring doctor recognizes that the deviating
doctor has a lower skill level than every specialist treating that illness and so routes them
no patients, making this deviation unprotable.
Finally, a su¢ cient, but not necessary condition that ensures positive prices for medical
services is
k(n)  1
n
nR
0
1
2
[v((i)) + v(	(i))] di
The lower bound on the price of specialist services is 32 t

g. The lowest possible value of
tg occurs when no doctor specializes. The above inequality ensures this price is positive.
For

te; tg; F 
	
as dened above, no doctor and no patient has a protable deviation,
making this equilibrium with s specialists a Nash equilibrium
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I. Doctors
Type I Referring Generalist Referring Type 2
Specialist Doctors Doctors Specialist
0 s/2 (3s)/4 n-(3s)/4 n-s/2 n
II. Patients
Specialist Treatment Generalist Treatment No Treatment
0 s n-s/2 n
Figure 2: Equilibrium Allocation of Patients and Doctors
For any number of patients seeking treatment by medical experts, tg, te, and F  ensure
that supply equals demand in every market: the number of referring doctors equals one half
the number of specialists; the number of patients seeking referrals equals twice the number
of referring doctors and the number of patients seeking care without a referral equals the
number of generalist doctors. Figure 2 illustrates what the equilibrium looks like.
Within a given market, all doctors make the same amount. Despite di¤erential skill
levels among doctors, patients cant observe those di¤erences and, as a result, pay for the
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"average" benet associated with a doctor in that market. Across markets, referring doctors
and generalists make the same amount, tg. That must happen to equilibrate the number
of doctors in these two markets. If, say, the price of generalist services was greater than
the price of referring services, each generalist would switch markets and become a referring
doctor.
Specialists at least as much or more than generalists or referring doctors (the specialists
net payment, te   t

g
2 must be greater than or equal to t

g). Referring doctors can identify
the skill level of specialists. This identication means a generalist or referring doctor who
deviated to take advantage of the higher specialist wage would be routed no patients. The
specialist, in other words, is compensated for his higher skill level, but at the level of the
average specialist in his market.
Since referring doctors and generalists have the same payo¤, they could switch places
and it would still be an equilibrium. In other words, the lineup of doctors in proposition 1 is
not the only possible Nash equilibrium. Notice, however, the prices (tg, te; F ) depend on
the anticipated generalist pool. Because consumers are risk averse, they are willing to pay
more for generalist treatment by a doctor with a lower spread in outcomes.6 Among the
6Formally, this can be seen by noting that the patients expected utility if matched with doctor i for
generalist treatment is
1
2
v((i)) +
1
2
v(	(i))  tg   k(j)
The rst and second derivatives with respect to i are
1
2
[v0((i)]0(i) +
1
2
[v0(	(i)]	0(i)
1
2
[v00((i)]0(i)2 +
1
2
[v00(	(i))]	0(i)2
Since v00 < 0, the second derivative is negative, making the expected utility concave in i. Setting the rst
derivative equal to zero and solving yields
1
2
[v0((i)]0(i) =  1
2
[v0(	(i))]	0(i)
Since 0(i) =  	0(i), this equality holds when (i) = 	(i). This occurs for the doctor located at n
2
. Because
generalist treatment by this doctor results in the highest expected utility, the patient is willing to pay the
most for it and for treatment by doctors close to it:
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possible lineups of doctors with s specialists, the lineup in proposition 1 gives the highest
prices for all doctors and hence is a natural one to focus on.
A couple of further points are worth mentioning. First, patients with the lowest cost
per visit those patients, say, near a cluster of doctorsare the most likely to seek referrals.
Second, patients with the highest cost per visit those patient in, say, rural area are the
most likely to forgo treatment. Third, doctors with the highest skill level specialize. Fourth,
doctors who arent very good at any one illness become generalists. Fourth, the doctors who
choose to do referrals dont have the high skill level required to specialize, but arent good
enough at more than one illness to become generalists. These doctors do have an important
task in the model; they correctly diagnose and refer to the best available specialist.
1.3 Welfare Analysis
Now consider the welfare e¤ects of specialization. How many specialists would a planner
want to have? The welfare associated with an equilibrium with s patients seeking referrals
is
W (s) =
Z s
2
i=0
v((i))di+
Z n
i=n  s
2
v(	(i))di+ ::: (14)
1
2
Z n  3s
4
i= 3s
4
fv((i)) + v(	(i))gdi  :::
Z s
j=0
2k(j)dj  
Z n  s
2
j=s
k(j)dj
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Because of the symmetry of the patient outcome functions for type 1 and type 2 illnesses,
welfare can be rewritten as
W (s) = 2
Z s
2
i=0
v((i))di+
Z n  3s
4
i= 3s
4
1
2
fv((i)) + v(	(i))gdi
 
Z s
j=0
2k(j)dj  
Z n  s
2
j=s
k(j)dj (15)
Welfare is concave.7 The rst order condition is
v((
s
2
))  3
8

(v((n  3s
4
)) + v(	(n  3s
4
))

 
3
8

(v((
3s
4
)) + v(	(
3s
4
)

+
1
2
k(n  s
2
)  k(s) = 0
Since (n  3s4 ) = 	(3s4 ) and 	(n  3s4 ) = (3s4 ), we can rewrite the FOC condition as
v((
s
2
))  1
2

(v((
3s
4
)) + v(	(
3s
4
)

+
1
2
k(n  s
2
)
=
1
2

1
2
[v((
3s
4
)) + v(	(
3s
4
)]

+ k(s) (16)
The solution to (16) provides the optimal number of medical specialists, sW . To increase
the number of specialists by one unit requires an additional 1/2 unit of referral services,
leading to the rationing of 1/2 unit of patient care. The left hand side of (16) represents
7To see concavity, note that W 00(s) equals
1
2
0(
s
2
)v0((
s
2
))  9
16

0(
3s
4
)v0(0(
3s
4
)) + 	
0
(
3s
4
)v0(	(
3s
4
))

  1
4
k0(n  s
2
)  k0(s)
Since 0( 3s
4
) =  	0( 3s
4
), W 00(s) can be rewritten
1
2
0(
s
2
)v0((
s
2
))  9
16
0(
3s
4
)

v0((
3s
4
))  v0(	(3s
4
))

  1
4
k0(n  s
2
)  k0(s)
Notice that 0( s
2
) < 0 and k0 > 0. Since ( 3s
4
) > 	( 3s
4
), it must be true that v0(0( 3s
4
)) < v0(	( 3s
4
). Taken
all together, the entire expression is negative.
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the marginal benet from adding a specialist. This benet has two parts: (1) the surplus
above what that matched patient would have received from a generalist treatment and (2)
the cost saving from having 1/2 a patient forgo treatment. The right hand side of (16)
reects the marginal cost of adding another specialist. The addition of a specialist means
that 1/2 a unit of patients are no longer treated by generalists, resulting in a utility loss.
And, the addition of a specialist comes at the cost of a unit of patients making an extra
doctor visit.8
1.3.1 Corner Solutions
Up to now, I have assumed an interior solution to the planners problem. Yet s is bounded
between 0 and 2n3 . The optimal solution might lie at the corners: either all doctors serve
as generalists (s = 0) or every doctor who can feasibly serve as a specialist does (s = 2n3 ).
In addition, the social planner might not want to employ all the doctors.
W 0(s) is the net additional benet from adding a specialist. Welfare is concave. If
W 0(0) < 0, social welfare will be decreasing as the social planner employs any more than
zero specialists. And so, it is optimal to have no specialists. Alternatively, if the marginal
gain from adding a specialist is still positive at s = 2n3 (i.e., W
0(2n3 ) > 0), it makes sense
to employ the maximum number of specialists.9 These results are described in gures 3
8 In this analysis, I only consider one class of welfare functions, where each patient is weighted by the social
planner equally. The results might di¤er with di¤erent weights for di¤erent patients (like, say, weighting the
patients with the highest benet from treatment the most). That is to say, the analysis might not be robust
to di¤erent welfare functional forms.
9This result can be easily derived. Set up the constrained maximization problem: max
s
W (s) subject to
s  0 and s  2n
3
. The Lagrangian is
eL =W (s)  1[s  2n
3
] + 2[s] (A1)
The relevant FOCs are
@eL
@s
= 0 (A2)
1[s  2n
3
] = 0 (A3)
2[s] = 0 (A4)
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and 4. Figure 3 represents the situation where it is optimal to have the maximum number
of specialists (s = 2n3 ). Note that the slope of the tangent line at
2n
3 is positive. Figure 4
represents the situation where it is optimal to have no specialists. Note that the slope of
the tangent line at 0 is negative.
1; 2  0 (A5)
@ eL
@s
= W 0(s)   1 + 2 = 0. Suppose W 0(s) < 0: For (A2) to hold 2 > 0. As a result, sW= 0; otherwise
(A4) wont hold. Suppose W 0(s) > 0. For (A2) to hold 1 > 0. Given this positive multiplier, s = 2n3 or
else (A3) wont hold.
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W’(2n/3)>0
W(s)
0 2n/3
Figure 3: Corner Solution with Maximum Specialists
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W(s)
W’(0)<0
0 2n/3
Figure 4: Corner Solution with No Specialists
The likelihood of either corner solution depends on the slope of the patient outcome
function and the cost of each visit, a logical outcome since this slope reects the gains from
specialization. In dening formally the proposition, the following denition is useful
k = 2v((
n
3
))  3(v((n
2
))
Notice that k is increasing as the gains from specialization increase. That is, as (n3 ) grows
with respect to (n2 ), k
 gets larger. We have the following result:
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Proposition 2 (i) If k(0) > 12k(n), as the gains from doctor specialization vanish,
the social planner sets prices such that no doctor specializes . (ii) When k(2n3 )  k the
social planner sets prices such that every doctor who feasibly can specializes. (iii) When the
cost per visit is su¢ ciently high, the social planner sets the number of specialists equal to
zero and employs fewer than n doctors.
Proof:
Because of symmetry of the benet functions: 	(3s4 ) = (n   3s4 )). Given this, W 0(s)
can be written as
v((
s
2
))  3
4
(v((
3s
4
))  3
4
v((n  3s
4
)) +
1
2
k(n  s
2
)  k(s) (28)
Proof of (i).
W 0(0) < 0 if the following condition holds
v((0))  3
4
(v((0))  3
4
v((n)) < k(0)  1
2
k(n) (29)
Suppose the gains from specialization vanish. That means that (0) = (n). The LHS of
the above equation must be less than zero. A su¢ cient condition for the inequality to hold
is that the RHS is positive, which happens whenever k(0) > 12k(n):
Proof of (ii)
W 0(2n3 ) > 0 if the following holds
v((
n
3
))  3
4
(v((
n
2
))  3
4
v((
n
2
)) +
1
2
k(n  n
3
)  k(2n
3
) > 0 (30)
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which reduces to
v((
n
3
))  3
2
(v((
n
2
))  1
2
k(
2n
3
)
The LHS denes k, which completes the proof.
Proof of (iii)
The welfare associated with employing one less doctor (the best generalist), but still no
specialists is
W (0) =
1
2
Z n n
2
  1
2
i=0
fv((i)) + v(	(i))gdi+ 1
2
Z n
i=n n
2
+ 1
2
fv((i)) + v(	(i))gdi 
Z n 1
j=0
k(j)dj
This welfare is greater if the following condition holds true
1
n
Z n
i=0
1
2
fv((i)) + v(	(i))gdi  k(n) < 0
In that event, the social planner wants to employ no specialists and also restricts the num-
ber of generalists treating patients
Depending on the shape of the welfare function, we might or might not have corner
solutions. It depends on the shape of the utility function and its relationship to the size of
the cost of the patient visit.
1.3.2 Maximizing Joint Prot
Now suppose that the doctors collectively set prices to induce their most-preferred equi-
librium. Will they pick prices that result in too many specialists or too many generalists
when compared to the social optimum? In answering this question, I assume that each
doctor must earn a positive price in equilibrium. In other words, doctors cant constrain
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the total number of doctors participating in the overall market (as generalists, specialists,
or referring doctors). Instead, the choice of prices simply shifts the proportion of doctors in
each practice.
Doctors maximize total prot by choosing an equilibrium with s referring doctors. Be-
cause of the "full employment" assumption, this choice determines the number of specialists,
the number of generalists and the number of referring doctors. Prot equals
(s) = ste(s) + (n 
3s
2
)tg(s) (31)
Prots are concave. Setting the rst order condition equal to zero gives
te + s
@te
@s
+ (n  3s
2
)
@tg
@s
  3
2
tg = 0 (32)
Let sPM be the prot maximizing number of medical specialists. The following threshold
condition is used in the next proposition:
k =
(94s
W   12n)k0
2
Proposition 3 When doctors collectively set prices, three di¤erent outcomes are
possible. (1) If k(n  sW2 ) > k doctors set prices to induce a level of specialization which is
more than the social optimum; (2) If k(n  sW2 ) < k doctors set prices to induce a level of
specialization which is less than the social optimum; and (3) If k(n  sW2 ) = k , doctors set
prices to induce a level of specialization which is the social optimum.
Proof:
Assume the patient indi¤erent between specialist and generalist treatment has illness 1.
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From equations (4) and (5), the following can be derived:
tg =
1
n  3s2
n  3s
4R
3s
4
1
2
[v((i)) + v(	(i))] di  k(n  s
2
) (33)
te =
1
s
2
s
2R
0
v((i))di  1
n  3s2
n  3s
4R
3s
4
1
2
[v((i)) + v(	(i))] di  k(s) + tg (34)
Plugging in tg and te into the prot equation and doing some algebra gives
(s) = 2
s
2R
0
v((i))di+
n  3s
4R
3s
4
1
2
[v((i)) + v(	(i))] di  sk(s)  (n  5
2
s)k(n  s
2
) (35)
From (15), we know
W (s) = 2
Z s
2
i=0
v((i))di+
Z n  3s
4
i= 3s
4
1
2
fv((i))
+ v(	(i))gdi 
Z s
j=0
2k(j)dj  
Z n  s
2
j=s
k(j)dj (36)
Rearranging (36) gives
W (s) +
Z s
j=0
2k(j)dj +
Z n  s
2
j=s
k(j)dj =
2
Z s
2
i=0
v((i))di+
Z n  3s
4
i= 3s
4
1
2
fv((i)) + v(	(i))gdi (37)
Subtract sk(s) + (n  52s)k(n  s2) from both sides of (37). The result is
W (s) +
Z s
j=0
2k(j)dj +
Z n  s
2
j=s
k(j)dj   sk(s)  (n  5
2
s)k(n  s
2
) =
2
Z s
2
i=0
v((i))di+
Z n  3s
4
i= 3s
4
1
2
fv((i)) + v(	(i))gdi  sk(s)  (n  5
2
s)k(n  s
2
) (38)
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Or
W (s) +H(s) = (s) (39)
where H(s) =
R s
j=0 2k(j)dj+
R n  s
2
j=s k(j)dj  sk(s)  (n  52s)k(n  s2). The derivative of (39)
equals
0(s) =W 0(s) +H 0(s) (40)
At the optimal value, sW , W 0(sW ) = 0. If H 0(sW ) = 0, then, 0(sW ) = 0 meaning that
sW = sPM . Alternatively, if H 0(sW ) > 0, then, 0(sW ) > 0. Since  is concave it must be
that sPM > sW . Finally, if H 0(sW ) < 0, then, 0(sW ) < 0 and sPM < sW . After cancelling
common terms, H 0(sW ) equals
H 0(sW ) = 2k(n  s
W
2
)  sWk0(sW ) + 1
2
(n  5
2
sW )k0(n  s
W
2
) (41)
Since k00 = 0, we know that k0(s) = k0(n   s2) for any value of sW . Solving for k(n   s
W
2 )
gives the threshold condition
k =
(94s
W   12n)k0
2
(42)
If k(n  sW2 ) > k then H 0(sW ) > 0 and sPM > sW . If k(n  s
W
2 ) < k; H
0(sW ) < 0 and
sPM < sW . If sW  29n, the RHS of (42) is always negative and doctors will choose prices
such that there is too much specialization relative to the optimal amount
Compare this result to the model of a monopolist producing substitutes goods in two
separate markets. It is well-known that this multi-market monopolist will restrict prices in
both markets. Indeed, he will do so more than the standard monopolist (Tirole 1987 p. 70).
At the same time, the e¤ect on output in each market is indeterminate. By raising prices in
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market A, the multi-market monopolist increases quantity in market B. At the same time,
the multi-market monopolist raises the price in market B, restricting output in that market.
The end result in terms of output is indeterminate. Depending on the parameters of the
model, the above proposition suggests the same style of result in my model. Doctors will
set prices to induce (1) too many specialists and too few generalists; (2) too few specialists
and too many generalists; or (3) the optimal number of specialists and generalists.
The key di¤erence in my model is that the total number of doctors employed is xed at n.
By manipulating the prices, the doctors adjust how many doctors are doing each activity.
Unlike a multi-market monopolist, even if they wanted to, the doctors cant restrict the
total supply of services. When the doctors induce more specialists, they necessarily induce
fewer generalists. When they set prices to induce fewer specialists, more generalists come
as a by-product.
Take an example. Say we have 100 doctors. Suppose doctors decide on prices such
that 20 patients demand specialist services. 10 referring doctors are required to support 20
specialists. That choice leaves 70 generalists treating patients. If the doctors restrict the
output of specialists to, say, 10 that leaves 85 generalists treating patients. By restricting
the output in the market for specialists, doctors increase the supply and lower the price
in the generalist market. If the generalist price increases a great deal with an increase in
the number of specialists, doctors will set prices that result in too much specialization. If,
on the other hand, the generalist price only increases a little bit with an increase in the
number of specialists (because the risk averse patients are, say, willing to pay very little for
the better generalist pool), doctors will set prices that result in too little specialization.
Whether doctors pick prices to induce too few or too many specialists turns on the cost
per visit for the last patient treated at the social optimum, k(n  sW2 ). To see this, plug tg
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and te into (32). Collecting terms, we have
1
s
2
s
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0
v((i))di  1
n  3s2
n  3s
4R
3s
4
1
2
[v((i)) + v(	(i))] di
  k(s) + (n  3s
2
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@tg
@s
=
1
2
tg   s
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(43)
The LHS side of (43) is the marginal benet to the doctors of adding another specialist.
The RHS represents the marginal cost. Lets say the social optimal has 20 doctors providing
speciality services. Suppose k(n  202 ) is quite large. Given the inverse relationship between
this cost per visit and the generalist price, this means that 12 t

g is quite small.
Evaluated at the social optimum, then, the marginal cost is small and the marginal
benet remains unchanged (it doesnt depend on k(n   202 )). And so, the doctors select
more specialists than is socially optimal. The reverse holds if k(n   202 ) is small. In that
case, the marginal cost of an additional specialist (again measured at the social optimum)
is big and the marginal benet unchanged, inducing the doctors to select fewer than the
optimal amount of specialists.
1.4 Conclusion
Medical specialization by doctors is important. The role of referring doctors in facilitating
specialization has not been the subject of much study by health economists. This paper
is a step toward lling that void. To make the analysis tractable, the model ignores the
role of education and doctor investment in specialized skills. The skill level of each doctor
was taken as given. In a richer model, we might expect some doctors to make specialized
investments via fellowships or additional training. Those considerations are left for future
work.
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MEDICAL SPECIALISTS II: THE ROLE OF 
FELLOWSHIPS IN MEDICAL TRAINING 
2.1 Introduction 
Unlike many training situations, hospitals both train fellows and hire former fellows onto 
their staffs. Because, in staffing fellowship programs, the hospital partially determines the 
quality of its future workforce, the decisions about how many fellows to hire differs from the 
standard one studied in the literature. The hospital both provides educational benefits and 
reaps at least some of those educational benefits as employers. Yet any educational benefit 
provided to fellows might spillover - the fellows might cash in on their training themselves 
and not work for the hospital in the next period. This externality complicates the hospital's 
decision about how many fellows to employ in a given period. 
Fellowship programs in the United States playa large role in the advanced training 
of doctors. They are the last step in the training of specialists, lasting between one and 
three years. Most major-university hospitals have fellowship programs. The fellow has 
finished his residency and, in theory, works with a more senior doctor to learn the most 
advanced treatment and research in that area of medicine. Unlike residents, fellows can 
serve as attending physicians. They are fully registered and licensed. If need be, they can 
perform surgeries without supervision. They can help manage and train residents. More 
important, hospitals look to the fellowship programs to hire the next medical researcher in 
their practice. Fellowship programs, in other words, are the stream of medical specialist 
quality.
I start by investigating a single hospital and an overlapping generation of doctors. Each
period the hospital hires one seasoned medical researcher out of the pool of fellows who just
completed its fellowship program. Further, the hospital decides how many newly-minted
residents to bring into the fellowship program. The process repeats: each period the hospital
hires a senior doctor and matches them with a fresh set of fellows. The result from this
simple model is this: The longer the time horizon of the hospital has, the more fellows it
hires in any one period and, correspondingly, the higher the quality of the research produced
by the hospital. The longer time horizon gives the hospital a greater chance of recouping the
benets from the fellowship training program. Likewise, the higher the hospitals discount
rate the more patient the hospital is the more fellows it hires and the higher the average
quality of the seasoned doctors research.
Next, I consider the situation where the fellow can trade on their fellowship training by
treating patients in the private sector. I examine two cases. In the rst case, the price for
treatment in the private sector is exogenous. In the second case, the price for treatment
services in the private sector is endogenous. More precisely, with an exogenous treatment
price, the price is independent of the number of fellows produced in the prior period, but
does depend on the quality of the fellow. In this circumstance, I show that the hospital
has less of an incentive to employ fellows. The reason: Program expansion increases the
odds that a fellow will be of high quality and, as a result, able to receive a lucrative outside
option. Therefore, by training additional fellows the hospital confers a positive externality
on the fellows.
With an endogenous treatment price, the price depends on (1) the number of fellows
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owing out of the program in the prior period and (2) the fellows quality. With an en-
dogenous treatment price, program expansion drives down the price of treatment services
(by increasing the supply of fellows and, as a result, the number of doctors in the private
sector). The hospital has more of an incentive to employ fellows than in the exogenous price
case.
The upshot of the model is that the hospitals time horizon, its discount rate, and the
features of the non-academic, private sector market determine the size and scope of the
fellowship programs. The size and scope of the fellowship program a¤ects the quality of
medical research. And so, we get a positive relationship between a hospitals concern about
the future and doctor quality and medical research. But this e¤ect doesnt come from the
conventional story of the hospital wanting to maintain a good reputation. Instead, it arises
out of the unique training grounds associated with medicine.
I use an overlapping generation model (OLG), which has been called one of the two
building blocks of modern macroeconomics (La Croix and Michel 2002, p. 1). Macro-
economists have used the model to study the accumulation of capital (Diamond 1965),
the funding of education (Glomn and Ravikumar 1992; de la Croix and Monfort 2000),
tax versus debt nancing of public expenditures (Diamond 1965, King 1992, Grossman
and Yanagawa 1993), and the impact of altruism on intergenerational transfers (Barro and
Becker 1989).
Samuelson (1958) is a foundational paper for this style of model. He shows that a pure
exchange economy can have multiple equilibria. In one equilibria, the interest rate equals
the growth rate of the population; in the second equilibria, there is no trade whatsoever.
Samuelson, then, argues that a social agreement to use money as a store of value can
eliminate the "no trade" equilibrium.
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In the other seminal OLG paper, Diamond (1965) nds convergence of the capital in
an economy, but that convergence might be ine¢ cient. In other words, an economy under
perfectly competitive conditions can accumulate too little or too much capital. That result
has been the subject of an extensive follow-on literature (see, for example, Hu 1979; Nourry
2001; Fanti and Spataro 2006).
Micro-economists have picked up the overlapping generation model to examine a number
of issues. Tadelis (2002), for example, shows how a "market" for reputations that are distinct
from the employees of the rm can maintain incentives for short-lived agents. Cremer (1986)
demonstrates how the development of social norms in an innitely-lived corporation can
encourage "good" behavior by short-lived agents. Cremer also provides a rationale for why
the youngest workers are often given the most di¢ cult tasks. The reason: If they shirk,
young workers are subject to more years of punishment at the hands of other workers in
the organization.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops the benchmark model with a single
hospital and overlapping generations of doctors. Section 3 expands the model, containing
the results when the fellows outside option depends on his skill level and the price he gets
for treating people in the private sector. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Benchmark Case
Consider a single hospital that lives for multiple periods. The hospital produces medical
research, which results from the combined e¤orts of senior researchers and medical fellows.
Because medical research is capital intensive, I assume that the hospital has the capacity
to employ at most one senior doctor to engage in research each period. The hospital can,
however, match or employ as many fellows as it wants to work with this senior doctor.
Senior doctors have either a high skill level H or a low skill level L. Let the skill level
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be the hospitals payo¤ from employing a doctor, with H greater than L. The payo¤ from
employing the seasoned doctor depends on the number of fellows matched with that doctor.
These payo¤s are increasing and concave in the number of fellows.1
In the rst period, the senior doctor has a low skill level.2 The fellowship program
trains a discrete number of fellows, s 2 [0;m]. The hospital also observes the fellows in
action, which means the hospital can distinguish between fellows likely to have a high skill
level as a senior researcher and those likely to have a low skill level. Whether the training
program produces at least one high quality researcher depends on the number of fellows
in the program. To capture this in the easiest way, assume that each fellow transforms
into a high quality researcher with probability p. He becomes a low quality researcher
with probability 1  p. These probabilities are independent of the number of fellows in the
program.3 The independence assumption means that there is no negative e¤ect on fellow
training associated with "crowding" i.e., multiple fellows attempting to learn from a single
senior researcher. Under these assumptions, the probability that a pool of size s fails to
produce at least one high type is
probfno high type jsg = (1  p)s
This is the probability of "no successes" from a binomial distribution, where the draws are
1Obviously, employees of the hospital both treat patients and conduct research. I abstract away from
the treatment decision here. The same results apply if we view H and L as the hospitals payo¤ from the
combination of treatment and research.
2 I make this assumption for simplicity. At the beginning there are no fellowship programs and hence no
training. As a result, the rst doctor hired has low skill. Realistically, the rst doctor could be a high type
or stochastically determined. If I allowed for this, the results would remain substantially similar.
3 I also assume that a fellow is equally likely to be a high type when matched with a high skill doctor or a
low skill doctor (that is, the value of p is the same). We might include di¤erent probabilities of producing a
high or low type fellow as a function of the senior doctors skill level (say p and p0, where p0 is the probability
of a high type when matched with a high type senior doctor, and p0 > p). While more realistic, this addition
to the model would complicate the notation without adding new insights.
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the number of the fellows in the pool. Clearly, this probability is decreasing in s.
The timing of the game follows:
1. The hospital hires a single seasoned doctor to engage in medical research.
2. The hospital decides on a number of fellows, s1, to assign to the seasoned doctor in
the fellowship program.
3. The period ends.
4. The hospital hires a single seasoned doctor out of the pool of fellows from the prior
period.
5. The hospital decides how many new fellows, s2, to assign to that doctor through the
fellowship program.
2.2.1 One Period Model
In a one period model, the hospital will choose the number of fellows, s1, to maximize
L(s1)  ws1
Since the maximization problem involves selecting a discrete number of fellows, it is useful
to dene the following function
G(w; s1) = [
L(s1)  ws1]  [L(s1   1)  w  (s1   1)]
G(w; s1) represents the incremental gain in prot from moving from s1   1 fellows to s1
fellows. The concavity of L(s) implies that the additional benet of increasing s by one
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unit is always decreasing.4 It follows that, for all s1,
G(w; s1) > G(w; s1 + 1)
At the maximum, es(w), the following condition must hold:
G(w; es1)  0  G(w; es1 + 1) (1)
This equation says that the hospital continues to employ fellows until the incremental gain
from adding one more fellow falls below zero.5 The relationship is illustrated in gure ve.
The prot function reaches its maximum at 5 fellows. Notice that G(5) the di¤erence
in prot from employing ve rather than four fellows  is positive. While G(6)  the
incremental prot from employing six fellows rather than ve  is negative. Condition 1
picks out the maximum number of fellows, given the hospitals choice is discrete.
4Note that H and L are continuous in s. The trouble is that the hopsital is restricted to selecting an
integer number of fellows. Concavity means that @
H
@s
> 0; @
L
@s
> 0; @
H
@s@s
< 0; and @
L
@s@s
< 0: The second
order conditions mean that the marginal improvement in payo¤ from an additional fellow is decreasing. In
the discrete choice case, this reduces to condition (1).
5For a full description of the conditions for maximization where the choice variable is discrete see Sah
and Zhoa (1998).
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Profit
1 2     3        4 5        6         7         8        9 10      11 Number of fellows
G(5) G(6)
Figure 5: Graph of the G-Function
2.2.2 N-Period Model
Suppose now that the hospital lives for n periods and discounts the future at a constant
rate . What will happen to the number of fellows employed in period one? We solve by
backward induction. If the fellowship program in period n   1 produced at least one high
type researcher, the hospital selects its newly minted fellows to maximize
H(sn)  wsn
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Denote the solution to this equation as sHn . If the fellowship program failed to produce at
least one high type, the hospital maximizes
L(sn)  wsn
Denote the solution to this equation as sLn . Plugging in the optimal number of fellows
generates the prot associated with employing a high type and low type respectively.
H(sHn )  wsHn
L(sLn)  wsLn
To make the model interesting, assume that, no matter the time period, the hospital prefers
to employ a high quality researcher when one is available (i.e., H(sHt ) wsHt > L(sLt ) wsLt
for all t). Take a step backward and consider the hospitals choice of fellows in period n 1.
The expected payo¤ in period n is
V n(sn 1; sHn ; s
L
n) = [1  (1  p)sn 1 ][H(sHn )  wsHn ] + (1  p)sn 1 [L(sLn)  wsLn ]
In period n 1, there are two possibilities: either the pool of fellows in period n 2 produced
at least one high quality type or it didnt. Denote the two possibilities as i 2 [H;L]. At
n  1, the hospital will maximize
i(sn 1)  wsn 1 + V n(sn 1; sHn ; sLn) (2)
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The incremental prot function is
Gin 1(w; sn 1) = [
i(sn 1)  wsn 1 + V n(sn 1; sHn ; sLn)] 
[i(sn 1   1)  w  (sn 1   1) + V n(sn 1   1; sHn ; sLn)]
Under the same reasoning as above, at the maximum sin 1 the following condition must be
true
Gin 1(w; s
i
n 1)  0  Gin 1(w; sin 1 + 1)
The solution to this problem gives a set of fellow choices, fsLn 1; sHn 1g, depending on whether
the prior hospital inherited a high type or not from the prior period. Plugging these values
into equation (2) gives the maximum obtainable two period value, V n 1(sn 2; sLn 1; sHn 1).
This value is
V n 1(sn 2; sLn 1; s
H
n 1) = [1  (1  p)sn 2 ][H(sHn 1)  wsHn 1]+
(1  p)sn 2 [L(sLn 1)  wsLn 1] + V n(sn 1; sLn ; sHn )]
Do the same analysis all the way back to time period one. In so doing, we see that the
hospital in period one wants to maximize
L(s1)  ws1 + V 2(s1; sH2 ; sL2 )
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The incremental prot function from this equation is
GL1 (w; s1) = [
L(s1) ws1+V 2(s1; sH2 ; sL2 )]  [L(s1 1) w(s1 1)+V 2(s1 1; sH2 ; sL2 )]
(3)
The superscript, L recognizes that, in period one, we assumed that only low types were
available to the hospital. So, we can restrict attention to just GL1 (i.e., there is no G
H
1 ).
6
At the maximum, sL1 , the following condition must hold:
GL1 (w; s
L
1 )  0  GL1 (w; sL1 + 1) (4)
A close inspection of this condition provides the rst result.
Proposition 1 A hospital with a n-period time horizon employs at least as many
and often more fellows in period one than a hospital with a one period time horizon (that
is, sL1  es1).
Proof:
We want to show that sL1 - the maximum number of fellows associated with the n-period
problem is greater than or equal to es1 the optimal number of fellows from the one period
problem. Proving this result reduces to checking whether the following two conditions hold:
GL1 (es1 + 1) > G(es1 + 1) (a1)
GL1 (es1) > G(es1) (b1)
To see why, note that the maximization condition of the one period model implies that
6 In the latter parts of the paper, the superscript is dropped to simplify the notation.
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G(es1 + 1)  0: Condition (a1) states that GL1 (es1 + 1) > G(es1 + 1). Given this inequality,
there are two possible cases.
In case one, GL1 (es1 + 1) > 0. If this is true, equation (4) teaches that es1 cannot be
the maximum value associated with GL1 . Moreover, because G
L
1 is concave, the incremental
prot function decreases as s1 increases. Therefore, in case one, concavity implies that the
maximum value, sL1 , must be bigger than es1.
In the second case, GL1 (es1+1) < 0 which means that es1 might be the maximum for the
n-period problem. But to be sure, we need to know that GL1 (es1) > 0. If so, then es1 is the
maximum associated with the n-period problem (this follows from equation (4)). Condition
(b1) states that GL1 (es1) > G(es1). Equation (1) tells us that G(es1) > 0. When condition (b1)
holds, then, it must be true that GL1 (es1) > 0. And so, es1 is the maximum in the n-period
problem. The proof thus reduces to checking for condition (a1) and condition (b1).
Start with condition (a1). We know that V 2(es1+1; sH2 ; sL2 ) = [1  (1 p)es1+1][H(sH2 ) 
wsH2 ] + (1   p)es1+1[L(sL2 )   wsL2 ] + V 3(). We also know that V 2(es1; sH2 ; sL2 ) = [1   (1  
p)es1 ][H(sH2 ) wsH2 ] + (1  p)es1 [L(sL2 ) wsL2 ] + V 3(). Because (i) (1  p)es1 > (1  p)es1+1
and (ii) the prots from employing a high type are always greater than the prots from
employing a low type, it follows that V 2(es1 + 1; sH2 ; sL2 ) > V 2(es1; sH2 ; sL2 ):
After collecting terms and rearranging equation (3), we can write GL1 (w; es1 + 1) as
GL1 (w; es1 + 1) = G(w; es1 + 1) + [V 2(es1 + 1; sH2 ; sL2 )  V 2(es1; sH2 ; sL2 )]
Because the second term is positive, it follows that GL1 (w; es1 + 1) > G(w; es1 + 1). As a
result, condition (a1) holds.
Turn now to condition (b1). Reasoning as above, we know that V 2(es1; sH2 ; sL2 ) = [1  
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(1   p)es1 ][H(sH2 )   wsH2 ] + (1   p)es1 [L(sL2 )   wsL2 ] + V 3() and V 2(es1   1; sH2 ; sL2 ) =
[1   (1   p)es1 1][H(sH2 )   wsH2 ] + (1   p)es1 1[L(sL2 )   wsL2 ] + V 3(). Again, since (i)
(1  p)es1 1 > (1  p)es1 and (ii) employing the high type is always more protable, it must
be the case that V 2(es1; sH2 ; sL2 ) > V 2(es1   1; sH2 ; sL2 ). Rewrite GL1 (w; es1) as
GL1 (w; es1) = G(w; es1) + [V 2(es1; sH2 ; sL2 )  V 2(es1   1; sH2 ; sL2 )]
The bracketed term must be positive, which implies that GL1 (w; es1) > G(w; es1) condition
(b1) holds, which completes the proof
In light of this proposition, we can also derive some results about the quality of medical
research in period one. The value of medical research in period one is L(s1). This value
is an increasing function of the number of fellows employed. As such, the hospital with
an n-period time horizon provides better research in period one than a hospital with a
one-period time horizon.
The second insight from the benchmark model involves the relationship between the
discount rate and the number of fellows employed. As the discount rate gets bigger (the
hospital weighs future consequences more heavily), the number of fellows it employs in-
creases. Each additional fellow provides a kicker in terms of the likelihood of nding a
high quality doctor in the next round. The benet of this kicker depends on how much the
hospital cares about the future. More formally we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When the hospital has an n-period time horizon, there is an increas-
ing relationship between the number of fellows employed and the discount rate.
Proof:
GL1 (w; s
L
1 + 1) is an increasing function of . As  increases the cuto¤ point (where the
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incremental gain from one more fellow is just positive) increases. This means that for a
su¢ ciently large increase in , the optimal number of fellows increases
2.3 The Model with A Valuable Outside Option
Up until this point, we have assumed that senior researcher, no matter their quality, had
an outside option of zero. Why would this be so? In a more realistic setup, the high quality
fellows would have better outside options than the low quality fellows. Imagine that the
doctor can decide to work for the hospital or work in the private sector. In the private
sector, they treat patients. The value of this outside option depends on two factors: (1) the
price for treatment services and (2) the number of patients the doctor can treat. As noted
in the introduction, I focus on two cases. In the rst subsection, the price for treatment
is independent of the number of fellows pumped by the hospital into the market. In the
second subsection, this assumption is relaxed. The cases correspond to situations where the
research hospital is one of many small producers of medical talent and a situation where
the research hospital is the single producer of medical talent in a particular eld.
2.3.1 Exogenous Treatment Price
Suppose that the senior researcher can treat patients in the private sector for a price r per
unit. In addition, assume that low quality doctors can treat one patient per period. High
quality doctors can treat  patients per period, where  > 1. I restrict attention to a two
period model.
In period two, the hospital selects the size of its second period fellowship program to
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maximize
H(s2)  ws2 if a high type is available
L(s2)  ws2 if a high type is unavailable
Like above, denote the values of s2 that solve these equations as sH2 and s
L
2 respectively. In
this extension, the hospital has to pay the high skill researcher more to forgo their outside
option. In period two, the prot from employing a high type and low type respectively are
thus
H(sH2 )  wsH2   r if a high type is available
L(sL2 )  wsL2   r if a high type is unavailable
To keep the model interesting, assume that the prot from employing a high type in period
two is always higher than the prot from employing a low type (the thinking, here, is that
the hospital could always choose a low type if it wanted to).7 In period one, the hospital
selects the size of its rst period fellowship program to maximize
L(s1) ws1 + 
 
[1  (1  p)s1 ](H(sH2 )  wsH2   r) + (1  p)s1(L(sL2 )  wsL2   r

) (5)
Denote the solution to this equation as s1. It is easy to show the relationship between the
number of fellows employed in the extension and the number of fellows employed in the
benchmark model. The next proposition formalizes that result.
7This assumption holds so long as  is not too large, more precisely that  < 1 + (
H wsH2 ) (L wsL2 )
r
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Proposition 3 In an environment where the senior researchers outside option is
positive, exogenously set, and depends on the fellows skill level, the hospital employs the
same number of fellows or fewer in period one than in the n-period model (that is, sL1  s1).
Proof:
Denote as G1 the incremental prot function associated with equation (5). To prove
that sL1  s1, we need to check for the following two conditions:
GL1 (w; s1 + 1) > G1(w; r; s1 + 1) (a2)
and
GL1 (w; s1) > G1(w; r; s1) (b2)
where s1 is the optimal number of fellows derived from equation (5). Start with condition
(a2). After some rearranging, we can write GL1 (s1 + 1) as
8
GL1 (s1+1) = G1(s1+1)+

((1  (1  p)s1+1)r + (1  p)s1+1r)  ((1  (1  p)s1)r + (1  p)s1r)
Focus on the bracketed term. Because (i) (1  p)s1 > (1  p)s1+1 and (ii) r > r, it follows
that the bracketed term must be positive; and so, condition (a2) holds.
Turn now to condition (b2). After similar rearranging as above, we can write GL1 (s1) as
GL1 (s1) = G1(s1)+

((1  (1  p)s1)r + (1  p)s1r)  ((1  (1  p)s1 1)r + (1  p)s1 1r)
Like above, because (i) (1  p)s1 1 > (1  p)s1 and (ii) r > r, the bracketed term must be
positive. This means that condition (b2) holds, which completes the proof
8 In the remainder of the paper, I drop the arguments in G other than the number of fellows.
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The idea is that investing in additional fellows increases the chance that a fellow will
have a high type and thus a lucrative outside option. The gains from training, then, produce
a positive externality, captured by the senior researcher (they get a bigger share of the rents
from the hospital than they previously received). Anticipating the positive externality, the
hospital employs fewer fellows in period one.
2.3.2 Endogenous Treatment Price
Let the demand for medical treatment be linear and equal to A   Br. Suppose that the
only doctors treating patients come out of the fellowship program from the hospital. The
supply of treating physicians in period two is thus determined by (1) the size of the period
one fellowship program and (2) the realization of the random variable, X, which reects
the number of high types in the pool. For a given value of s1 and a realization of high types
X (which will be a number between 0 and s1), the supply of treatment is
s1   1 if X = 0 or X = 1
(X   1)+ [s1  X] otherwise
To illustrate the mechanics behind this supply schedule, consider the case where the pool
fails to produce a high type (X = 0). In that case, there are s1   1 low quality doctors
treating in the private sector and one low quality doctor working for the hospital. Suppose
that X = 1 (the pool produced exactly one high quality type). In that case, the hospital
hires the one high quality type and the remaining s1   1 low quality fellows work in the
private sector. Suppose that X=2. In that case, one high quality type works in the hospital;
one high quality type treats  patients in the private sector, the remaining s1 2 low quality
fellows treat one patient that period. Finally, suppose that the pool produces all high types
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(X = s1) There, the hospital hires a high type and the remaining s1   1 high types each
treat  > 1 patients. With this supply schedule in hand, we can derive the equilibrium
price by setting supply equal to demand. And so,
r =
A  (s1   1)
B
if X = 0 or X = 1
r =
A  [(X   1)+ [s1  X]]
B
otherwise
The equilibrium price will depend on demand parameters and three other things. First, it
will depend on s1 the number of fellows in the program and hence the number of doctors
treating patients in the private sector. Second, it will depend on X the realized number
of doctors with a high skill level. Third, it will depend on  the number of treatment
procedures the high-skilled researcher can do. As each of these values increase, there is an
increased supply of treatment and, as a result, a decrease in the equilibrium price.
At the time the hospital decides on the size of its fellowship program, the value of X
is unknown and hence the equilibrium price, r(X; s1) is also unknown. The hospital will
select s1 to maximize its expected prot, which can be written as
L(s1)  ws1 + 

s1
0

(1  p)s1 [L(sL2 )  wsL2   r(0; s1)] + (6)


s1
1

p(1  p)s1 1[H(sH2 )  wsH2   r(1; s1)] + :::

s1
s1

ps1 [H(sH2 )  wsH2   r(s1; s1)]
Denote the solution to this equation as s1.
By increasing the size of the training program, the hospital reduces the equilibrium price
(in expectation). This results in a lower outside option, meaning that the hospital must
pay less to attract the medical talent (whether low or high quality). When the treatment
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price is endogenous, there are thus two benets to increasing pool size: (1) it increases the
chance of getting at least one high quality researcher in the second period and (2) it drives
down the outside option price, increasing the payo¤ whether or not the training program
produces a high type. This, in turn, drives the hospital to increase the size of the pool
relative to the environment where the treatment price is exogenous. More formally, we have
the following nal result.
Proposition 4 In an environment where the treatment price is endogenously set,
for any value of s1 such that r > maxfrC(s1   1); rC(s1)g, the hospital selects at least as
many or more fellows in the rst period as in the environment where the treatment price is
exogenous. That is, we have s1  s1.
Proof:
Let G be the incremental prot function associated with equation (6). Applying the
method from proposition 1, we need to check two conditions:
G(s1 + 1) > G1(s1 + 1) (a3)
G(s1) > G1(s1) (b3)
Start with condition (a3). Recall that G1(s1 + 1) is dened as
G1(s1 + 1) = G1 + [(1  (1  p)s1+1)[H(sH2 )  wsH2   r] + (1  p)s1+1(L(sL2 )  wsL2   r)]
 [(1  (1  p)s1)[H(sH2 )  wsH2   r] + (1  p)s1(L(sL2 )  wsL2   r)]
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Likewise, we can dene G(s1 + 1) as
G1(s1 + 1) = G1+

26664
 
s1+1X
X=1
 
s1+1
X

pX(1  p)s1+1 X [H(sH2 )  wsH2   r(X; s1 + 1)
!
+
(1  p)s1+1(L(sL2 )  wsL2   r(0; s1 + 1))
37775
  
26664
 
s1X
X=1
 
s1
X

pX(1  p)s1 X [H(sH2 )  wsH2   r(X; s1)
!
+
(1  p)s1(L(sL2 )  wsL2   r(0; s1))
37775
Generate a new variable, H(s1 + 1). Do so, by replacing in G1(s1 + 1) all the values of
r(X; s1+1) and r(X; s1) with r(0; s1). Since r(0; s1) is bigger than r(X; s1) and r(X; s1+1)
for all values of X, it follows that H(s1 + 1) < G(s1 + 1) (basically, we have increased the
cost of the outside option in every state of the world). If H(s1 +1) > G1(s1 +1), it follows
that G(s1 + 1) > G1(s1 + 1). Since we replaced all the di¤erent values of r(X; s1) with a
common value, we can rid ourselves of the factorials and write H(s1 + 1) as
H1(s1 + 1) = G1+
f(1  (1  p)s1+1)[H(sH2 )  wsH2   r(0; s1)]+
(1  p)s1+1(L(sL2 )  wsL2   r(0; s1)g
  f(1  (1  p)s1 [H(sH2 )  wsH2   r(0; s1)]
+ (1  p)s1(L(sL2 )  wsL2   r(0; s1))g
Note that H(s1 + 1) is equivalent to G1(s1 + 1), when the outside option price, r equals
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r(0; s1). Move back now to G1(s1 + 1) and take its derivative with respect to r
@G1(s1 + 1)
@r
=    (1  (1  p)s1+1)  (1  p)s1+1 + (1  (1  p)s1)+ (1  p)s1
Rearranging and collecting terms, the derivative reduces to

 
(1  p)s1+1(  1)  (1  p)s1(  1)
Because (1   p)s1 > (1   p)s1+1 and  > 1, it follows that @G1(s1+1)@r < 0. If it turns out,
then, that r > r(0; s1), it must be true that H(s1+1) > G1(s1+1) There are two reasons.
As noted, H(s1 + 1) is equivalent to G1(s1 + 1) when G1(s1 + 1) is evaluated at r(0; s1).
Second, G1(s1 + 1) is decreasing in r. Denote the threshold value that makes this true as
rC(s1). Condition (a3) holds whenever r > rC .
Move now to condition (b3). We can write G1(s1) as
G1(s1) = G1+
f(1  (1  p)s1)[H(sH2 )  wsH2   r] + (1  p)s1(L(sL2 )  wsL2   r)]g
  f(1  (1  p)s1 1)[H(sH2 )  wsH2   r] + (1  p)s1 1(L(sL2 )  wsL2   r)g
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Doing the same manipulation as above, compute H(s1) as
H1(s1) = G1+
f(1  (1  p)s1)[H(sH2 )  wsH2   r(0; s1   1)]
+ (1  p)s1(L(sL2 )  wsL2   r(0; s1   1))g
  f(1  (1  p)s1 1)[H(sH2 )  wsH2   r(0; s1   1)]+
(1  p)s1 1(L(sL2 )  wsL2   r(0; s1   1))g
Focus again on G1(s1) and take its derivative with respect to r
@G1(s1)
@r
=    (1  (1  p)s1)  (1  p)s1 + (1  (1  p)s1 1)+ (1  p)s1 1
Rearranging terms again, we see that this derivative equals
(
 
1  p)s1(  1)  (1  p)s1 1(  1)
which must be less than zero because (1   p)s1 1 > (1   p)s1 and  > 1. Because the
derivative is negative, if r > r(0; s1   1), it follows that H(s1) > G1(s1). Denote this
value rCC(s1   1). Condition (b3) holds whenever r > rCC . As a result, condition (a3)
and condition (b3) both hold whenever r  maxfrC(s1   1); rC(s1)g, which completes the
proof
2.4 Conclusion
The medical fellowship program is a unique labor market. The hospital uses fellows to
enhance the research of the current senior doctors on its sta¤. At the same time, the
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hospital understands that it is training the next generation of researchers. Yet, because of
constraints on capital, the hospital will not be able to hire all of the fellows as researchers.
Some will go to the private sector. As a result, the hospital will have trouble capturing all
the returns to its investment in the fellowship program. On the one hand, the larger the
program is, the more likely the hospital is to nd at least one high quality researcher in
the fellow pool, pushing the hospital toward an expansive program. If, however, the high
quality researcher can trade on that quality in the private sector, the hospital will be forced
to pay him more to come on board. This fact reduces the benet from having a high skilled
researcher in the pool and limits the incentive to expand the pool. If the hospitals program
provides the bulk of treating physicians in a specic area, this e¤ect is muted. By expanding
the program, the hospital drives down the price received for services in the private sector,
reducing the value of the outside option. This, in turn, limits the amount of surplus the
high quality researcher can extract from the hospital. Interestingly, the more physicians the
hospital supplies to the private sector, the better its research is each period.
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